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This very Comprehensive Resource has numerous links to Burner Management Systems Technical Papers across a broad range of subjects and isIndexed Alphabetically - please click on the bookmarks to go to the relevant section that interests you. Design and Specification of Burner Management Systems | Burner Management System Standards | Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Application in Burner Management Systems | Maintenance of Boiler Management Systems | Organisations and Forums Related to Burner Management Systems |Burner Management Systems Definitions, Abbreviations and Acronyms | Other Burner Management System Links | Specific Australian Burner Management System Regulations | TÜV Functional Safety Engineer (FSEng) Training |
Controls and Burner Management Systems (BMS) on Direct-Fired Multiple Burner
Heaters - Although some detailed and prescriptive guidelines have been
around for many years, the rate and degree of adoption varies significantly
within the industry. Most operating companies have their own “standard”,
which may still vary from facility to facility. In addition to this, for each
installation, it is not unusual for adjacent heaters built two years apart to
have a different BMS design, simply because different engineering contractors
built them. With increasing government legislation and regulations as well as
mounting lawsuits for accidents in which applicable codes and guidelines have
not been adhered to, it is important to review the BMS requirements for both
existing and new heater installations - from Onquest.
Burner Management – A Straightforward Approach for Typical Systems - David Sheppard - This powerpoint presentation covers the Purpose of a BMS, Why one should implement BMS in a SIS, State Transition Approach to BMS Design and reviews an example Design of a typical BMS System - From Emerson Process Management.
Selecting Safety System Designs - Charles M. Fialkowski - It would be pretty easy to understand how process facilities operate at many different levels of risk depending on how and what they’re processing. In addition, there are also many different methods for designing safety instrumented systems to address this risk. Questions regarding which technology should be used – hard-wired relay, pneumatic or programmable; what level of redundancy is appropriate – single, dual or triple; and how often should the system be tested – monthly, quarterly, yearly or once per shutdown – are being asked by users and engineering firms alike. Debate continues as to how one even makes these choices (past experience, qualitative judgment, quantitative analysis, etc.) - from Control Engineering.
Flame Safety - Christopher Filoon - Whether your plant has a heater, thermal oxidiser, sulphur recovery unit, incinerator, cracking furnace, waste gas boiler or any other type of combustor, one question remains: how well are your investments protected? The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 86 and similar international standards partially address this concern by requiring flame scanning on burners and start-up burners for combustors firing up to 1,400°F (760°C)1 to help protect plant equipment and personnel. Flame scanners detect the presence or absence of a burner’s flame in order to provide an input for a burner management system to determine the state of the burner’s fuel valve – but how safe are the flame scanners supervising the burner’s combustion? - from Coen Company, Inc.
Flame Safety - Many Industries burn large qualtities of hydrocarbon fuels to heat a wide range of materials. the most important consideration in the operation of combustors is safety - from Coen Company, Inc.
Safety Controls and Burner Management Systems (BMS) on Direct-Fired Multiple Burner Heaters - Safety controls on direct-fired heaters have continuously evolved over the recent past, and the evolution has accelerated over the last five years. This has been due to the introduction of government legislation which actively enforces the application of existing codes. Although some detailed and prescriptive guidelines have been around for many years, the rate and degree of adoption varies significantly within the industry. Most operating companies have their own “standard”, which may still vary from facility to facility. In addition to this, for each installation, it is not unusual for adjacent heaters built two years apart to have a different BMS design, simply because different engineering contractors built them. With increasing government legislation and regulations as well as mounting lawsuits for accidents in which applicable codes and guidelines have not been adhered to, it is important to review the BMS requirements for both existing and new heater installations - from Born Heaters Canada Ltd.
Specification of Safety-Integrated Burner Management Systems - Burner Management Systems (BMS) are one of the most widespread process safety applications. Historically, there has not been much guidance on the use of automation systems for BMS, and industry standards left much to interpretation; this changed with the release of International Society for Automation’s (ISA) technical report ISA-TR84.00.05-2010, Guidance on the Identification of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) in Burner Management Systems (BMS). Those with an understanding of the basic requirements of ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 and other good engineering practices applicable to BMS are the audience for this report - from totallyintegratedautomation.com.
Burner Management Specification Tutorial Webcast - Learn how to properly specify a PLC–based burner management system (BMS) compliant to today's industry safety standards (NFPA, API, ISA) as Siemens' Certified Functional Safety Expert Charles Fialkowski and Control Global's Editor in Chief Walt Boyes discuss what’s new and relevant.
Building a Safe Reliable Burner Management System - A new era is dawning for burner management systems (BMS). Thanks to changing and broadening regulatory standards, the door has opened to embrace the Safety-PLC based BMS solution—an approach that not only allows a manufacturing plant to include safety in one complete, integrated automation solution but also reap a multitude of benefits ranging from reduced costs and design time to improved safety and performance - from Siemens.
Detecting Loss of Flame in Oil Refinery Fired Heaters using Advanced Pressure Diagnostics - John P. Miller and Randy S. Stier - Maintaining stable combustion is critical to the safe operation of fired heaters. When the ratio of air flow to fuel flow to a burner transitions from a point inside the burner’s operating envelope to a point outside the burner’s operating envelope, the combustion process becomes unstable and then stops. If this loss of flame is not recognized and acted upon properly, an explosion may occur. One possible way to detect loss of flame may be to monitor pulsations in the difference between the flue gas pressure inside a fired heater and atmospheric pressure at a given elevation (commonly referred to as “draft”) - from Emerson Process Management.
The following links are compliments of Pilz
Programmable Safety and Control Systems for Use in Burner Control - Adam Hallinan -There are many BMS systems running today which do not comply with current standards. They are either using non approved standard PLC’s or antiquated relay based control systems. Not only is the potential failure to danger a risk to man and machinery but even non dangerous sporadic failures can be difficult to fault find and lead to costly down time. Programmable safety and control systems (PSS) suitable for use in BMS have been available for well over 10 years now. These controllers can identify any dangerous failures before they create a hazardous situation, and also provide a level of diagnostics to minimise downtimes. By taking the I/O into the field, large distributed applications with many burners can be accommodated economically with minimum install time, and also safely.
Safe firing - Optimised Hardware and Software for Burner Management - Today’s modern burner controls for commercial and industrial gas and oil firing systems do more than just start the burner safely. They monitor and control all functions from ignition of the ignition burner through to the operating position of the main burner – all on the basis of the standards EN 298 and EN 230.
Programmable and Networkable Burner Management Systems- A Case Study - This paper discusses the benefits of Programmability in Burner Management Systems (BMS). There are many BMS systems running today which do not comply with current standards. They are either using non approved standard PLC’s or antiquated relay based control systems. Not only is the potential failure to danger a risk to man and machinery but even non dangerous sporadic failures can be difficult to fault find and lead to costly down time. By taking the I/O into the field large distributed applications with many burners can be accommodated economically with minimum install time.
Programmable Safety Systems for Burner Management on Gas Turbines - As the demand for energy throughout Australia increases the demand for alternative sources is increasing accordingly. The use of gas turbine generation to supply small to medium requirements is becoming increasingly popular. The principles of Safe Burner Management in typical gas Boiler/Burner applications are equally relevant to Gas Turbines. Many existing Turbines in Australia were installed prior to current standards and regulations and in many cases using traditional Hard Wired control systems. As these control systems are being upgraded with current technologies such as PLC’s and DCS’s special attention must be paid to ensure regulations are complied with.
Safety Systems and Concepts for Burner Management - The second example for an optimized safety system is about burner management applications(BMS): All around the world thousands of BMS are installed which do not fulfill appropriate safety levels. But this is not the only reason to change such a BMS: often these relay based control systems have reached a life cycle where relays do not work reliably any longer. For small BMS it is rather easy to fix such an error. But as many modifications are done during time critical situations (unexpected downtime during a failure: the system has to be made operable again) changes are often not documented which makes the next repair more difficult. .Therefore even small BMS applications with traditional relay control are not maintainable after a certain time.
Excellent BMS Information follows from A E
Case Study: Safety Instrumented Burner Management System (Si-Bms) - This case study discusses the application of the Safety Lifecycle as defined by ANSI / ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 mod) to two (2) single burner multiple fuel boilers.
Industry Update BMS ISA04-P280 - This paper explores the current trends in the market place and the industrial process control industry in general with respect to Burner Management Systems and their relationship to Safety Instrumented Systems. The concept of a Safety Instrumented Burner Management System is introduced and explained in detail.What is the Safety Integrity Level of my existing BMS? - Michael D. Scott, P.E./ Iwan van Beurden / David Cochran - Many facilities have existing legacy Burner Management Systems that utilize a General Purpose Safety Configured PLC as the logic solver. Most of these systems were installed prior to the development and finalization of ANSI/ISA 84.01, IEC 61511 and / or IEC 61508. This paper discusses the issues, decisions, and challenges encountered when attempting to apply the concepts of the Safety Lifecycle per ANSI/ISA 84.01, IEC 61508 and / or IEC 61511 to the design of an existing BMS for a single burner natural gas fired installation. In addition, development of a Markov model for a General Purpose Safety Configured PLC, identification of some typical BMS Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) and subsequent Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) determination are discussed in detail.
Burner Management System Safety Integrity Level Selection - Michael D. Scott - This paper discusses how quantitative methods can be utilized to select the appropriate Safety Integrity Level associated with Burner Management Systems. Identifying the required amount of risk reduction is extremely important especially when evaluating existing legacy Burner Management Systems. Selection of an overly conservative Safety Integrity Level can have significant cost impacts. These costs will either be associated with increased Safety Instrumented System functional testing or complete removal / upgrade of the existing Burner Management System. In today’s highly competitive business environment, unnecessary costs of any kind cannot be tolerated.
Standard's use spreading, but confusion still surrounds Fire and Gas Systems - Kimberly A. Dejmek and Richard Skone - Consistency is the hallmark of any great organization or process. When it comes to fire and gas systems (FGSs), consistency is not a desired goal; it is a must. But since the promulgation of ISA S84.01 in 1996, there has been confusion surrounding the treatment of fire and gas systems. Some believe that the standard excludes coverage in fire and gas systems, while others prepare FGS specifications that require compliance with ANSI/ISA S84.0.01-1996. This has led to inconsistency in the approach between and within operating companies - from the ISA and InTech
Safety Instrumented Burner Management Systems – Requirements For The Paper Industry - Bud Adler/ Michael D. Scott - What most of the companies do not yet realize is that all safety critical processes must be analysed and their potential risk determined. It has come as a surprise to many that Burner Management Systems (BMS) associated with fired devices in the pulp and paper industry such as, dryers, kilns, thermal oxidizers, power boilers and black liquor recovery boilers are all defined as Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) if they contain sensors, a logic solver and a final control element according to ANSI/ISA 84.01. Additionally, FM Approval Standard 7605 requires that PLC based BMS must comply with IEC 61508. This paper explores the requirements for conformance to ANSI/ISA 84, IEC 61508, IEC 61511, NFPA 85, NFPA 86 and BLRBAC guidelines.
A Database Approach to the Safety Life Cycle - Michael D. Scott/Ken O’Malley - A systematic database approach can be used to design, develop and test a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) using methodologies that are in compliance with the safety lifecycle management requirements specified in ANSI/ISA S84.01. This paper demonstrates that through a database approach, the design deliverables and system configuration quality are improved and the implementation effort is reduced.
The following links are from Triconex
A Typical Burner Management Control Panel Layout - This drawing shows how a typical Burner Management Control Panel may be laid out.
IEC61511 states that SIS Users must show Competence in Functional Safety - When it comes to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) logic solvers, the process industry reached a consensus in specifying that the equipment be third party certified to meet IEC 61508 parts 2 and 3. Most Process plant require that SIS certification be issued by TÜV, recognizing this lab as the safety systems "Mark," even when safety standards don't mandate certification of SIS equipment by any specific testing lab.What should be the process industry consensus around the personnel responsible for the design and implementation?
Integrating Control and Safety - Where to Draw the Line - Robin McCrea-Steele, TÜV FSExpert - New digital technology now makes it feasible to integrate process control and safety instrumented functions within a common automation infrastructure. While this can provide productivity and asset management benefits, if not done correctly, it can also compromise the safety and security of an industrial operation. This makes it critically important for process industry users to understand where to draw the line. Cyber-security and sabotage vulnerability further accentuate the need for securing the Safety Instrumented System (SIS).
Dual SIS Technologies do not cost less than TMR; They almost always Cost More -Many companies advertise their Dual SIS technology (1oo2D (Dual), 1oo2DR (Dual Redundant), 2oo4D) as a lower-cost alternative to Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) systems. This is an unfortunate misrepresentation of the capabilities of Dual SIS architectures. Dual PLCs in a 1oo2 (1 out of 2) configuration were the initial solution of choice for "fail safe" applications, but they cannot overcome an inherent problem with false trips.
Is a TÜV Certificate Enough? - Robin McCrea-Steele, TÜV FSExp - SIS vendors advertise their TÜV certification, but rarely tell you about their implementation and operational restrictions - Most safety system vendors focus on how the system performs when it is healthy, but don't talk much about what happens when an internal failure is diagnosed; worst case, the entire system shuts down. Each SIS vendor must provide clear information on factors that might impair system performance, such as the system's implementation, specific programming or configuration requirements, module or architecture choices, and operational restrictions.
Given a Choice, the Implementation and Installation of your SIS should not be Entrusted to Strangers - Choosing an SIS implementer can be as important as choosing the product itself. No matter how well the system is designed or manufactured, failures are likely to occur if the implementation team is not following proper procedures, is not experienced, or lacks adequate technical qualification for the tasks they must perform.
What is the Importance of Third Party Certification and SIL rating of SIS devices? - Luis Duran - Based on the growing number of safety certified devices or systems in the automation marketplace, these are the times of Functional Safety Certification, especially in the process industries. However as basic as it might sound, is there a “one-size-fits-all” certification process? Or how useful is that “certified equipment” for your application? From the reasons that gave birth to third party certification agencies through the remaining fundamental need for their work today, the questions to answer are: what is the end user getting with the certification?; how can the end user benefit by utilizing certified equipment?; why this might be better than using “proven in use” equipment as defined by IEC61511? This paper presents a practical perspective to understanding certification and selecting and applying certified devices or systems while deploying a safety instrumented system, and highlights what else remains to be done by the implementation team and end users to fulfil the requirements of current safety standards as IEC61511 and best engineering practices.
Why is Conforming to Safety Standards Important? - Compliance to National and International safety standards is enforceable if the standards are listed or referenced in the country's legislation. These references are sometimes called "good engineering practices." The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) USA law and the Australian Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) are examples of this legislation. Other countries e.g. Germany and the UK are required to adopt IEC-61508 /61511 when applying safety instrumented systems to process hazards.
Safety Considerations Guide - This guide provides information about safety concepts and standards that apply to the version 2.x Triconex® General Purpose System however there is some really useful information contained in Chapters 1 and 2.
The following is an edited copy of a blog by Emerson Process Management
Systems, it covers the subject really well;
In prior posts on safety and regulatory standards and burner management functional safety, it was highlighted that some of the developments in standards for burner management systems (BMS). These include:
In addition to the standards listed above, there are even more standards, guidelines, and recommended practices that apply to burner management systems. BMS-related standards, guidelines, and recommended practices are published by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), International Society of Automation (ISA), American Petroleum Institute (API), European Committee for Standardization (CEN), and FM Global (FM) organizations. Here are a few examples:
The various BMS standards all serve the same purpose-they tell a process manufacturer how to avoid situations where dangerous failures could occur and they describe what to do when any of these situations are detected:
The standard process manufacturers choose to follow will be based on regulatory requirements, company policy, plant location, familiarity of standards, insurance requirements, and/or specific BMS application (e.g., boiler, furnace, type of fuel, etc.)
Chuck Miller noted that different BMS standards could also be used together, at the same time. For example, a prescriptive standard such as NFPA 85 can be used with a performance-based standard such as IEC 61511, and each standard has its own merits. In fact, one may bolster the value of the other to ensure best practices are being used for safety lifecycle management.
Chuck stresses that it’s also important to remember that product/system “certification” really means, “certified for use“, in a particular application. While this indicates that a system can meet the requirements of these guidance documents, the installer still has the challenge of configuring the necessary functionality. In addition, acceptance of the system and confirmation that the system does in fact meet the requirements typically lies with the local jurisdictional authority.
Andy Crosland summed up his views by pointing out that there are hazards associated with potential problems with fire-heated equipment, and the purpose of a BMS is to keep the equipment and personnel safe. Specific hazards for each burner, fuel, etc. should be analyzed and have appropriate protection measures applied.
IEC 61511 provides a framework for evaluating these hazards and implementing safety instrumented system (SIS) safeguards to protect against them. Prescriptive BMS standards provide requirements that state specifically what must be done. The prescriptive requirements can be used as the basis for the safety requirement specification in the IEC 61511 safety lifecycle management process.
The original full text blog can be found at Safety Standards and Burner Management Systems
Now? More Standards for Safety and Regulatory Compliance - Mike Schmidt and
Chuck Miller – A good overview of BMS standards and requirements – from
Emerson Process Management.
Implementing a BMS via ISA TR 84.00.05 “Guidance on the Identification of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) in Burner Management Systems (BMS)” - Steve Papp - The ISA84 committee determined that it was appropriate to provide supplemental information on the application of hazard and risk analysis to Burner Management Systems (BMS). The purpose of ISA TR 84.00.05 is to provide users of ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 with guidance on how to identify safety functions within the BMS. The presented work processes and illustrations are not intended to replace, but instead to supplement, the requirements of good engineering practices applicable to BMS, such as NFPA 85, NFPA 86, API 556, ASME CSD-1, and API RP 14C – from the ISA.
The Challenge of Updating Existing Furnace Burner Management Systems (BMS) to Meet International Safety Requirements - Charles M. Fialkowski and Daniel Molnar - This paper reviews how NFPA 86 (Standard for Ovens and Furnaces) can be further improved by incorporating many of the concepts listed within the latest ISA technical report TR.84.00.05, Guidance on the identification of safety instrumented functions in burner management systems – from Siemens Energy and Automation.
Invoking the Equivalency Clause in NFPA Standards for Designing Compliant Burner Management Systems - Charles M. Fialkowski , Michael Polagye and Mike Scott - In recent years, all three of the NFPA standards have acknowledged the growing presence of advanced safety PLC technologies into BMS by adding an annex of explanatory material. The annex states how to create safe systems using either method, and recognizes that system performance is achievable. However, there is still confusion because many sections in the NFPA explicitly state that certain procedures have to be followed. This paper will review some of the ‘prescribed’ elements contained within the NFPA standards. It will also show which technical arguments can be issued to help users claim “equivalency,” as it’s defined in the NFPA standard - from Siemens.
Why High Integrity is used in Burner Management System Applications - Luis Duran - This document is a useful reference which details BMS standards - from ABB
ICSS Systems offer Advances in Fired Heater Operations, Safety and Regulatory Compliance - Chuck Miller - To improve the safety and operational uptime of these critical systems, professional associations have collaborated to develop good engineering practices applicable to industrial flame management systems, such as NFPA 85, NFPA 86, API 556, ASME CSD-1, FM 7605 and API RP 14C. Why are so many standards required? - from All Risk Engineering.
Managing Combustion Safety - Tom Oakey and Glenn Showers - A Procter & Gamble engineer and consulting engineer share ways to develop corporate combustion safety standards and a combustion safety program - from GAI Consultants Inc.
Combustion Safety for Furnace Operation - Glenn Showers - This article provides an overview of the requirements of NFPA Standard 86 with an emphasis on the theory of combustion safety as it applies to any type of combustion device, especially a direct-fired furnace- from GAI Consultants Inc.
Introduction& Background to IEC 61508 - Ron Bell - Over the past 25 years there have been a number of initiatives worldwide to develop guidelines and standards to enable the safe exploitation of programmable electronic systems used for safety applications. In the context of industrial applications (to distinguish from aerospace and military applications) a major initiative has been focussed on IEC 61508 and this standard is emerging as a key international standard in many industrial sectors. This paper looks at the background to the development of IEC 61508, considers some of the key features and indicates some of the issues that are being considered in the current revision of the standard. Thanks to crpit.com
Standards Compliance and User Requirements for Industrial and Utility Boiler Control Systems - Dr. Issam Mukhtar & Geoff Rogers - AS61508 and AS61511 standards for Safety Instrumented Systems have been accepted by Australia as best practice engineering for general applications and as a basic requirement by the Energy Safety Authorities for “type B” appliance application approvals of gas fired plants. Considerations of multi-fuelled multiple-burner systems. This paper outlines Premier Consulting Services experience in implementing the standards on Industrial and Utility Boilers, Process Heaters, Furnaces and Gas Turbine applications, with and without Heat Recovery Steam generators. Issues and challenges in complying with AS3814/NFPA85 and AS61508 /61511 are also discussed highlighting some recommendations. Issues to consider when selecting and maintaining control system hardware and software. There are references to Australian Case studies on boilers, furnaces, gas turbines. This paper was originally presented at IDC Boilers Conference, Perth November 2008.
Application in Burner Management Systems - A Case Study -Thermal Burner-
Jorge Sanchez - Boiler, furnaces and other burning equipments are considered as
high-risk areas within the Process Industry. This is due to extreme operating
conditions and processing of hazardous materials resulting in wide safeguarding
measures being applied to prevent accidents. One of the best known and widely
accepted technical solutions concerns the use of safety-related systems
implemented through PES technology. New risk-based standards published in recent
years control the design of these technical solutions. They include
technology-oriented requirements with their ‘adequate’ implementation and
the ‘fit-to-purpose’ tailoring of the equipment. However, to obtain
functional safety this approach demands more management, competency and planning
than the prescriptive requirements of original codes. This paper presents a case
study about the identification of safety functions. It includes lifecycle
activities carried out to achieve functional safety requirements and comply with
the original approach for Burner Management Systems - thanks to IDC
When a SIL Rating is not Enough - Robin McCrea-Steele - SIL rating is a measure of the risk reduction capability and probability of failure-on-demand. It measures only the "Fail Safe" nature of the device and should not be the primary or sole measurement considered when selecting a safety system - from Triconex.
Maintenance for Burner Management Systems (BMS) - What you Don’t Know about
your Boiler System Can Hurt You - Glenn Showers – This article presents
findings on a number of boilers and how Boiler Management Systems can fail. It
also gives details on how to develop a preventive maintenance program to help
reduce the incidence of BMS failure - from GAI Consultants Inc.
The Importance of Burner Management Control - Glenn Showers - Continuous operator training and regular burner management system testing are key parts of proven boiler plant safety programs
Boiler Safety Intuition - Diagnosing Boiler Problems Sometimes Takes all the Senses - John R Puskar - This very interesting article gives some great tips on how to identify when your BMS is not working too well - from www.combustionsafety.com
Your SIS should Protect Your Plant for its Lifecycle - Production assets are built to last, and even when the investment is planned for a 20-year lifetime, additional investments frequently extend their life beyond the original design specification. Few safety systems can extend their lifecycle and enhance their capabilities over the complete lifetime of the production asset. A Safety Instrumented system should quietly provide year after year of safe and extremely reliable performance in mission critical applications. Its performance should be consistent and the user should not have to think about them very often - from Triconex.
Center for Chemical Process Safety - The Global Community Committed to Process Safety - CCPS is a not-for-profit, corporate membership organization within AIChE that identifies and addresses process safety needs within the chemical, pharmaceutical, and petroleum industries. CCPS brings together manufacturers, government agencies, consultants, academia and insurers to lead the way in improving industrial process safety.
Other Burner Management System Links
Upgrade Boilers with Energy Efficient Burners, an interesting article from
the US department of energy gives tips on how to save energy.
NOx Reduction with Improvement in Plant Efficiency - from Foster Wheeler - Texas Municipal Power Agency (TMPA) personnel developed a plan to lower NOx emissions at the Gibbons Creek plant as much as possible with only combustion modifications. This plan was to reduce NOx emissions without selective catalytic reduction (SCR). Gibbons Creek, a 480 MW unit, has reduced its NOx average from 0.35 lb/mmBtu to less than 0.12 lb/mmBtu for the 4th quarter of 2002, while at the same time improving unit operation and performance. Fuel delivery deficiencies were corrected, to provide balanced delivery to each burner. New low NOx burners, and separated over fire air was installed. Equipment to dynamically measure fuel flow and air flow to each burner level, and SOFA, was installed. After upgrades to the DCS system, a neural net system was implemented to adjust boiler firing while maintaining NOx and CO. This paper describes the methodology used, the equipment installed and the results of the performance testing.
Guidelines for Approval of Industrial Gas Appliances (Type B Appliances) in Western Australia- Director of Energy Safety, Office of Energy, Western Australia
Functional Safety Expert Governance Board -The CFSE is now administered by the CFSE Governance
Board which is in turn supported by a broad consortium of companies
including Honeywell, Pilz, Siemens, TUV, Exida and other leading
safety related firms.
Personnel Functional Safety Certification - Not All Programs Are Created Equal - As production runs ever closer to equipment and facility operating limits and new plants come on line in expanding and developing economies, the pressure to design and operate systems more safely and economically is increasing. A key to meeting this goal is having competent people who are knowledgeable and experienced in applying the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 / ISA 84 functional safety standards. To develop and measure an individual’s safety engineering competence, several personnel functional safety certification programs have been created. This paper discusses why these programs are needed and the benefits they deliver to individuals and companies alike. It will also review the characteristics and differences of the various certification programs on the market today, things to watch out for, and some important questions to ask when selecting a certification program- from CFSE.
Why should Process Safety Engineers be Certified? - The typical answer to this question is initially very defensive. Certified to what? By whom? Who mandates certification of plant personnel? Why? What does this buy me? - from Triconex.
Burner Management Systems Definitions, Abbreviations and Acronyms
Safety Terms and Acronyms Glossary - exida - This list of functional safety
terms and acronyms has been compiled from a number of sources listed at the end
including the IEC 61508, IEC 61511 (ISA84.01) standards. It is meant to provide
a general reference for engineers practicing safety lifecycle engineering in the
process industry. As such it provides both safety and related non-safety term
definitions in a clear useable form. It specifically highlights the most
important terms and acronyms from the safety lifecycle standards with working
level definitions. The reader is encouraged to pursue IEC 61508 or IEC 61511 for
additional definitions and for additional information on applying the safety
lifecycle to the process industry.
Rate of Safe failures (1/t)
λD : Rate
of Dangerous failures (1/t)
Rate of Safe failures, detected (1/t)
λSu : Rate
of Safe failures, undetected (1/t)
Rate of Dangerous failures, undetected (1/t)
Rate of Dangerous detected failures (1/t)
λDu : Rate
of Dangerous undetected failures (1/t)
ESD : Emergency
: A SIS or part of a SIS is considered as being fault-tolerant, if it
continues to perform its
FMEA : Failure
Mode Effect Analysis
Functional Safety Management
High Integrity (Pressure) Protection System
International Electrotechnical Commission
IEC 61508 : Functional
safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic
IEC 61511 : Functional
safety- Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
Average Probability of Failure on Demand
Programmable Logic Solver
SFF : Safe Failure Fraction: SFF = (λS+λDd)/(λS+λDd+λDu)
SIF : Safety Instrumented Function
Safety Integrity Level
SIS : Safety
Safety Requirements Specification
TMR : Triple Modular Redundant
Looking for more safety related information? Try ICEweb's Safety Instrumented Systems or Manufacturing Safety pages